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1. Introduction 
 
The recent brain drain literature suggests that the migration of highly skilled people 
can be beneficial for a country as it gives incentives to form additional human capital. 
The literature was pioneered by works such as Stark et al. (1997), Mountford (1997), 
Beine et al. (2001) and Stark and Wang (2002). Docquier and Rapoport (2012) 
provides a detailed survey of the theoretical and empirical literature surrounding this 
issue. 
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 We argue that the central proposition of the recent brain drain literature is very 
similar to the concept of ‘career concerns’ as analysed in Holmstörm (1999), 
Prendergast (1999) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2004). ‘Career concerns’ refers to 
the idea that the incentives to exert higher effort in work may come from the market. 
For example, when an individual works for two periods, the wage of the individual in 
the second period depends on the output of first period as the market regards the 
output of the first period as a signal of the individual’s intrinsic unobservable ability. 
Therefore the market provides a mechanism where an individual would exert high 
effort in work without the presence of an incentive compatible contract. In the second 
period however, without any future market, the individual exerts less than the 
optimum effort level. The incentive to form additional human capital in the recent 
brain drain literature operates the same way. The incentive there comes from the 
international labour market, as a high return of human capital from migration induces 
the individual to form additional human capital. We therefore forwarded our argument 
by proposing a model, in a similar way as in the career concerns literature. In our 
model the individual forms human capital in two consecutive periods, whereas 
migration opportunity ceases to exist in the second period. The incentive provided by 
migration is only available in the first period.  
 In addition, we suggest that the migration opportunity can distort the 
formation of skills when skills are heterogeneous. By heterogeneity we mean the 
heterogeneity of skill types (such as Mathematics, Language) as opposed to 
heterogeneity of abilities (high or low as in Stark and Wang, 2002). The migration 
opportunity may provide incentive to only one type of skill. This has a similarity with 
the idea of an individual performing multiple tasks (Holmstörm and Milgrom, 1991) 
Though the idea of multiple skills, in relation to migration, was raised in the past 
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(Todaro, 1996 cited in Docquier and Rapoport, 2012), only recently this has started to 
receive attention of the theoretical brain drain literature, such as Corrado and 
Stryszowski (2009), Stark and Zakhrenko (2012). Our paper contributes to this 
literature by proposing a multitask type model with different skills and shows that the 
migration opportunity for one skill negatively affects the optimal formation of another 
type of skill. The paper therefore, to some extent, is against the beneficial brain drain 
hypothesis. It should also be noted that the paper is itself not a work on the ‘theory of 
incentives’. We only utilise the structures developed by the theory as such, 
international migration can be viewed from that perspective. It is one of the 
contributions of this short paper, in addition to our regular analysis of the brain drain 
issue.  
 The rest of the paper is as follows. The second section provides the basic 
assumptions and analyses a model with a single type of human capital. In the third 
section we analyse a model with two types of human capital. The forth or final section 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
2.  One Type of Human Capital 
 
 We assume that the representative risk neutral individual exerts effort to form 
human capital in two periods. There exists one type of human capital, we denote it by 
h . θ  denotes the effort level. The formation of human capital as a function of θ  is,  
 
( ) ( )1ln1ln +++= θβθαh        (1) 
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 Where θ  is economy wide average effort, 0, >βα  are coefficients. Assume 
that the utility function is ( ) xxu =  and c  is the psychological disutility of making 
additional effort.  For simplicity assume that human capital h  gives return equal to h . 
The net utility of the individual in term of effort is, 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) θθβθαθ cu −+++= 1ln1ln       (2) 
 
 The equations (1) and (2) are similar to the equations used in Stark and Wang 
(2002) but our interpretation is different. In Stark and Wang (2002) the term θ  stands 
for the level of human capital, c  is the cost of per unit human capital and θ  is the 
economy wide average human capital. We instead define θ  as the effort,  c  as the 
disutility of effort and θ  as the economy wide average effort. This interpretation 
provides a clearer picture of the process of formation of human capital. As our 
equations are almost the same as Stark and Wang (2002) it also shows that a slight 
modification of the original interpretation can produce a drastically different result. 
  
 Stark and Wang (2002) focused on the positive externality of human capital, 
captured by θ , which potential migrants do not internalise. The externality is not the 
focus of our analysis hence β  is considered equal to zero. Now differentiating 
equation (2) with respect to θ  and assuming interior solution, 
 
0
1
=−
+
=
∂
∂ cu
θ
α
θ
 
 
Or, 1−=
c
αθ          (3) 
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 Following the brain drain literature, assume that there exists an exogenous 
migration probability p . Assume that the migrants get, hπ  where 1>π , that is 
migration gives higher return to human capital. The expected utility with migration is 
therefore, 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1ln11ln11ln1 +−+=+−++=−+ θαπθαθπαπ pppphuphpu  (4) 
 
 The net expected utility with migration is, 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) θθαπθ cppum −+−+= 1ln1       (5) 
 
 Differentiating equation (5) with respect to θ  and assuming interior solution, 
 
( ) 11 −−+=
c
ppπαθ  
 
 As 11 >−+ ppπ , the optimal effort to form human capital and the optimal 
level of human capital are higher.  
 We can now incorporate externality in the model and show that the 
opportunity of migration can act as a solution to the externality problem as shown in 
Stark and Wang (2002). We omit the analysis as it is now merely a routine 
calculation. In our context what is important is the optimal effort of the individual in 
the second stage of the lifespan. The optimal effort of an individual increases in the 
first period. However if we assume that the migration opportunity is not available in 
7 
 
the second period then without the presence of migration opportunity the effort of the 
individual drops in that period1.  
 The simple model we propose is capable of providing guidelines in actual 
issues pertaining to the formation of human capital. For example, the research outputs 
of many universities of developing countries are very poor though they do not lack the 
required expertise (e.g. PhDs from world’s best universities). It is sometimes said the 
faculty members of these universities are not motivated enough to undertake further 
research after completion of their PhDs. What is often not considered is the role of 
incentives on individuals’ research activities. The faculty members obtain PhD 
degrees to improve their CVs, to secure better positions and/or to migrate to better 
universities in the West. With full, partial or no realisation of these objectives, the 
need to acquire further human capital falls. Hence emphasis should to be placed on 
the continuity of incentives, instead of reliance on a market that is beyond any control. 
 
 
3. Two Types of Human Capital 
 
 In the previous section we developed a model where an individual exerts effort 
to form only one type of human capital. In reality the individuals often exert effort to 
form different types of human capital (e.g. Mathematics and Music). The multi-
dimensionality of effort to perform multiple tasks has been widely analysed in the 
literature following the seminal work of Holmström and Milgrom (1991). The 
                                                 
1 We do not provide the calculations for the second period as it is also quite straight forward. It should 
be also noted that the human capital acquired in the first period may ease the process of acquiring 
human capital in the second period, resulting in a reduced effort for the same level of human capital. 
We assume no such reduction of effort in the second period which is obviously an overly simplified 
assumption. Together total human capital of two periods is higher, but here we emphasis on the lack of 
migration motivated effort in the second period. 
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migration literature however has not looked at the multi-dimensionality of effort to 
form multiple human capital. The first section of the paper connected human capital 
with individuals’ effort level. This section connects different types of efforts with 
different types of human capital. 
 In particular, we developed a model with two types of efforts and two types of 
human capital. In relation to the brain drain literature, we are interested in the analysis 
of the effects of increased migration probability of one particular human capital on the 
formation the other human capital. To do so we utilise a simplified version of 
multitask model similar to the one used in Bolton and Dewatripont (2004, page 220).  
 Denote human capital by ih  where 2,1=i . The individual exerts effort iθ  to 
form human capital ih . Assume for simplicity that skill ih  gives a return equal to ih  in 
migrant’s home. There exists a migration probability of ip  for skill ih . If successful 
then migration gives return ii hπ  for skill i . Assume also that the relationship between 
effort and human capital is given by similar equations as was in (1). With the presence 
of migration probabilities, the expected return of the individual is, 
 
 
( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1ln1ln11ln1ln
1
22112122221111
2121222111
+++−−++++=
+−−++
θαθαθαπθαπ
ππ
pppp
hhpphphp
 
         …….. (6) 
 
 Assume that ∑
=
>
2,1i
iii hhπ  so that migration gives a higher return just from a 
single skill. We ensure it by assuming that iπ  is sufficiently large.  
 Let ( ) ( ) 2122221121 2
1, θδθθθθθψ ++= cc  be the cost or disutility of effort. If 
0=δ , the efforts are independent.  Assume 0>δ . The net utility in term of effort is, 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) 21222211
2211212222111121
2
1
1ln1ln11ln1ln,
θδθθθ
θαθαθαπθαπθθ
−+−
+++−−++++=
cc
ppppu
          ….. (7) 
 
 Differentiating with respect to 1θ  and assuming interior solution we get, 
 
( ) 0
1
1
1 2111
121
1
111
1
=−−
+
−−
+
+
=
∂
∂ δθθ
θ
α
θ
απ
θ
cpppu      (8) 
 
 We also have 
( )
( )
( ) 121
121
2
1
111
2
1
2
1
1
1
cpppu −
+
−−
−
+
−=
∂
∂
θ
α
θ
απ
θ
 and δ
θθ
−=
∂∂
∂
21
2u . 
Assume δ>ic so that the marginal cost of an effort type responses more to the 
change of that effort type than that of the other effort type.  It ensures 
jii
uu
θθθ ∂∂
∂
>
∂
∂ 2
2
2
 
as such the own second order partial derivative is higher in absolute value than the 
cross second order partial derivative. From (8) we obtain, 
 
( ) 01 22111211121111 =−−−−−−+ δθθδθθθααπ ccppp     (9) 
 
 By differentiating (7) with respect to 2θ , 
 
( ) 01 12122222221222 =−−−−−−+ δθθδθθθααπ ccppp                                    (10) 
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 Differentiating totally and assuming ,iπ iα , ic  and 2p  unchanged , we obtain 
from equations (9) and (10), 
 
02 221121111111111 =−−−−−− θδθδθθδθθθθααπ ddddcdcdpdp             (11) 
and, 
02 121122222212 =−−−−−− θδθδθθδθθθθα ddddcdcdp                          (12) 
 
 
 From equations (11) and (12) we obtain, 
 
D
cccc
dp
d 21211111212112212211
1
1 22 δαδθαδθαδθαπααπθαθαπθ ++−+−+−=  
 
where  
022224 22
2
1
2
11
2
112221121
2
222212121 >−−−+++++++= δθδθδδθδθθδθδθθθθ cccccccccccc
D
 as required for the stability.  
 Also we have, 
21211111212112212211 22 δαδθαδθαδθαπααπθαθαπ ++−+−+− cccc  positive by 
assumption. Therefore, 0
1
1 >
dp
dθ . Hence, when efforts are substitutes2, the effort for a 
type of human capital increases as migration opportunity of that type increases. 
Similarly we obtain, 
 
                                                 
2 Substitutability is however not essential to obtain a similar result (see Appendix). 
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02 111121122221211
1
2 <
+−+−−−−
=
D
cc
dp
d δααδπαδθαπδθαδθααθθ  
 
 Therefore the effort and consequently the human capital of one type falls as 
the migration opportunity of the other type rises. 
 The result we obtained was not surprising. It was also not difficult to calculate. 
However, the strength of the analysis lies in its ability to clearly illustrate the effects 
of the higher migration probability of one type of human capital on the optimal 
formation of different types of human capital. As the migration probability of one 
type increases, the formation of that human capital increases and the formation of the 
other human capital decreases. The results hence provide an insight on the 
asymmetric nature of the effects of migration on human capital formation. 
 Assume further that the economy faces an external shock that increases the 
migration opportunity in the first period. With the higher migration opportunity, the 
individual increases the effort in forming 1h  and reduces the effort in forming the 
other capital 2h . However, the individuals’ efforts return to the pre-shock levels in the 
second period. Therefore, if the migration opportunity distorts the formation of human 
capital in the first period, an absence of that in the second period helps to confront the 
distortion. 
 The effect of a shock, however, can be permanent.  As discussed in footnote 1, 
if the second period’s human capital to some extent depends on the first period’s 
human capital, the additional human capital of one type in one period may result in an 
increased formation of that type and a decreased formation of the other type in the 
second period. Hence an increased migration opportunity may have a lasting effect on 
the overall formation of human capital of an economy. 
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 We might conclude that the migration motivated additional human capital is a 
brain waste. From our analysis of the paper, however, we cannot yet make such a 
conclusion. The human capital is a brain waste when it is not useful for the country of 
emigration. To analyse it, we require a better understanding of a country’s objectives 
and the connection between the human capital and a country’s objectives. We have 
not defined any such objective and/or a model that is capable of analysing the welfare 
implications of migration. Instead we restricted the analysis in showing a weakness of 
recent brain drain literature that does not pay attention to the distortive influence of 
migration in the composition of different types of human capital within a country.  
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
 In this paper we suggested that international migration, when beyond the 
control of a country, is rather an unreliable incentive mechanism to support the 
formation of human capital. The individuals in different periods of lifespan face 
different migration opportunities. Migration opportunities may give incentives to form 
additional human capital in one period and none in other periods. In addition when 
skills are heterogeneous, the migration opportunity may distort the composition of 
human capital formation. We have not analysed how this distortion influences the 
overall economy but this paper suggests for a reconsideration of the idea of the 
beneficial ‘brain drain’. 
 The analysis of the paper is also directing towards some interesting future 
researches on multiple human capital. A natural extension of the analysis in this paper 
would be to design an incentive mechanism that is capable of the offsetting the 
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negative effects, if any, of migration opportunities. Another possible way is to 
consider how it shapes the international trade of a country by encouraging the 
production of import substituting skills. We may also want to study the effects of a 
temporary migration opportunity on the long run formation of human capital. In 
future, attempts to be made for extension of the analysis in these directions. 
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Appendix 
 
In this appendix we assume that 0=δ , The equations (9) and (10) respectively 
become, 
 
( ) 01 11211121111 =−−−−+ θθααπ ccppp     (A1) 
02 1111111111 =−−− θθθααπ dcdcdpdp      (A2) 
 
Therefore, 
( ) 0
2
1
111
11
1
1 >
+
−
=
ccdp
d
θ
απθ  
 
The equations (11) and (12) respectively become, 
 
( ) 01 12122222221222 =−−−−−−+ δθθδθθθααπ ccppp   (A3) 
02 2222212 =−−− θθθα dcdcdp         (A4) 
 
Implying that, 
0
2 222
2
1
2 <
+
−=
ccdp
d
θ
αθ  
 
Therefore substitutability is not essential to demonstrate that the increased migration 
opportunity of one skill has a negative effect on the formation of the other skill. 
